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[AQ: 1]
In the run up to Belgrade local elections held in March 2018, Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić 
suggested that the governing Serbian Progressive Party, of which he is also the president, might 
adopt an election poster used by Yugoslavia’s prime minister Milan Stojadinović in the late 1930s. 
The poster showed a man’s hand with scissors cutting through a promissory note, with a caption 
reminding the electorate of the government’s success in reducing peasants’ debts. While perhaps 
unusual, Vučić’s message was not surprising: among his most often repeated claims and promises 
is the alleged improvement in the standard of living in Serbia since he came to power in 2012 
(first as deputy prime minister, then prime minister and finally, in 2017, as president). More note-
worthy was Vučić’s reference to Milan Stojadinović, an interwar politician associated not only 
with state-controlled economic policies but also with authoritarianism and fascism. Vučić, a far 
right nationalist turned pro-EU reformer, strongly protests accusations of authoritarian style of 
leadership, but reportedly gave a copy of Stojadinović’s memoirs to Ana Brnabić before she suc-
ceeded him as prime minister in 2017. (Brnabić is the first female and openly gay prime minister 
in Serbia’s history, though she is widely perceived as a mere figurehead, the real power resting 
with Vučić).1
Vučić’s open associations with the controversial interwar leader appear to have been largely 
overlooked by the Serbian public. This should not be surprising: the president’s allies control much 
of the country’s media and the population is accustomed to his frequent references to historical 
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personalities; these range from Max Weber and Winston Churchill (who, incidentally, regarded 
Stojadinović ‘a potential Quisling and an enemy’ during the Second World War)2 to Zoran Djindjić, 
the first democratically elected prime minister of the post-Milošević era who was assassinated in 
2003 because of his reformist policies, and whose opponents included the current president in his 
previous political incarnation.
Nevertheless, the references to Stojadinović present the historian with an opportunity to revisit 
Yugoslavia in an era when democratic promise turned into a disappointment which facilitated the 
rise of authoritarian regimes throughout Europe in the 1930s – a development possibly analogous 
with the current slide towards authoritarianism and populism, not just in Serbia, but globally. It was 
also an era in Yugoslavia’s history when ideological divisions were complicated by a seemingly 
paradoxical political interplay. Increasingly authoritarian, if not outright fascist, tendencies by an 
elected head of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious government were kept in check by a prince-
regent and care-taker dictator, as well as an opposition coalition driven by a search for inter-ethnic 
compromise and the abolition of dictatorship. All this suggests a high degree of complexity which 
requires a nuanced approach to Yugoslavia, one that does not fit easily into established patterns of 
interpreting the interwar period.3
Democratic promises and practises
Scholarly works on interwar Yugoslavia have traditionally focused on the national question, col-
lapse of democracy and introduction of dictatorship, once classified in socialist Yugoslav histori-
ography as ‘monarcho-fascist’. While such an approach may be understandable, I suggest possible 
ways of reinterpreting the period by proposing two broad hypotheses: first, the liberal-democratic 
promise was one of the main raisons d’être of Yugoslavia when it was created in 1918 – and not 
just the South Slav (or Greater Serbian) nationalism, as is usually argued; the failure of democracy 
in the late 1920s was therefore as significant a destabilising factor as the nationality question. 
Second, I argue that the dictatorship introduced in 1929 did not succeed either, or at least it did not 
mean an end of democratic practices. The 1930s witnessed not just a foreign policy shift towards 
Berlin and Rome, but also the re-introduction of party politics and elections, while key political 
actors (both in government and opposition) pursued – with varying degrees of sincerity and suc-
cess – politics of negotiation and compromise. Thus, the traditional periodisation of the interwar 
years needs to be revised.
On the surface at least, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (as Yugoslavia was officially 
known between 1918 and 1929) was a prototype ‘successor state’ to the Habsburg monarchy. It 
was burdened by a complex pre-war legacy, including a delayed (certainly in comparison with 
Western Europe and North America) and regionally uneven modernization. Its population had suf-
fered unprecedented losses through violence and disease during the wars of 1912-1918, and infra-
structure was seriously damaged; the violence, albeit on a smaller scale, continued into the 1920s, 
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like it did elsewhere in post-war Europe.4 The peoples of what became Yugoslavia fought on dif-
ferent sides during the six-year Balkan war, though it would be too simplistic to reduce this conflict 
to ethnicity – many Serbs, for example, fought loyally in the Habsburg army, while some Croats 
and Slovenes joined the Serbian army, which also included non-Serbs from Kosovo, Sandžak and 
Macedonia. Yugoslavia needed to reconcile a society that was in some ways divided before it could 
be united; it was therefore a reconciliation project already in 1918, and not only after the 1941-
1945 war.
The collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy created a number of small, relatively unstable nation-
states which often treated their minorities as poorly if not worse than the empire they replaced (or 
empires, if Ottoman Turkey is included, as it should be when studying Yugoslavia). The Serb-
Croat-Slovene kingdom was in some respects a smaller version of the Austro-Hungarian empire, 
but it was also a South Slav nation-state committed to, its creators insisted, liberal democracy, 
parliamentary monarchy and free, land-owning peasantry.
Yugoslavia was proclaimed by Serbia’s and Habsburg South Slav leaders in Belgrade on 1 
December 1918 and therefore it was not created by the Allies in Paris as is sometimes wrongly 
claimed. (In fact, the Conference refused to recognise the new state until May-June 1919). Yet, its 
destiny was directly linked to the fate of the Paris settlement, whose foundation faults, according 
to its many critics, facilitated the rise of Fascism and Nazism. The First World War broke out after 
the assassination in Sarajevo of the Habsburg heir to the throne, and his wife, by a Bosnia-born 
Yugoslav nationalist on 28 June 1914 – anniversary, incidentally, of the 1389 Kosovo battle and a 
sacred date in the Serbian, and at the time also Yugoslav, nationalist calendar. The collapse of the 
Habsburg Monarchy and the humiliation of its key ally Germany at Versailles on 28 June 1919, 
were among the key outcomes of the global conflict which had begun with Austria-Hungary’s 
declaration of war against Serbia in late July 1914. Hitler’s rise to power in a Germany crippled by 
the harsh peace treaty cannot be understood outside of the context of the post-war, Versailles order.
Nazism was of course preceded by the emergence of Mussolini and Fascism in Italy.5 One of the 
key reasons for Italy’s revisionism was its failure to secure the incorporation of the whole of the 
Dalmatian coast at Paris because of the competing Yugoslav demands. If Serbia’s wartime leader-
ship had abandoned the united front with the Croats and Slovenes and pursued an enlarged Serbia 
rather than Yugoslavia, then Rome likely would have had its way. Yugoslavia, therefore, seemed to 
unite key factors which led to the interwar crisis more than any other successor state.
Besides the existence of the ‘Yugoslav idea’, which originated in early nineteenth-century 
Croatia, and Serbia’s early twentieth-century political and military achievements, the creation of 
Yugoslavia was facilitated by favourable international circumstances, of which the defeat and dis-
solution of Austria-Hungary was one. Despite a complex make-up, as suggested by the country’s 
original name, Yugoslavia fitted the dominant ideology on which the new international order, led 
by the United States, was to be based: the much quoted (and often misinterpreted) Wilsonian prin-
ciples, which promoted national self-determination and liberal-democracy. Yugoslav peacemakers 
in Paris acted in a belief that a Yugoslav nation-state was the best solution for the South Slav ‘ques-
tion’ (or, perhaps for the Serb and Croat ‘questions’). They viewed the Serb-Croat-Slovene state as 
a key member of a just and hopefully long-lasting peace settlement. At the same time, like other 
representatives of the victorious countries, they used the nationality principle and historical and 
economic arguments selectively and in ways which suited their goals best. Italy’s objections meant 
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that the new state was not immediately recognised, but the Yugoslav leaders eventually succeeded 
in securing most of their territorial aims. While their considerable diplomatic skills should not be 
overlooked when analysing these events, the international acceptance of the Yugoslav nation sug-
gests that a hundred years ago the idea of a South Slav ethnic and linguistic unity may not have 
seemed so far-fetched and unrealistic.6
Usually overshadowed by the nationality question and the issue of national self-determination 
is the interconnected and equally important question of democracy. In other words, it is hard to 
imagine that Yugoslavia would have been (eventually) accepted at Paris if its leaders had not dem-
onstrated a commitment to democracy. Parallel to the peace conference, elections for a constituent 
assembly were being held in the country and its leaders debated future constitution in the provi-
sional parliament. I would further argue that the success of the Yugoslav nationalism in the years 
preceding the war was also down to the democratic promise. Pre-war Serbia was attractive to the 
Habsburg South Slavs because it was an independent Slav state which opposed ‘oppressive 
empires’ (Ottoman and Habsburg), but also because Serbia was a democracy, however imperfect, 
even by the standards of the day, due to corruption and interference of the military in civil affairs. 
At least from the point of view of most Habsburg South Slav leaders and nationalist-revolutionary 
youth organisations – one of which was Young Bosnia – Belgrade offered an increasingly attractive 
alternative during the decade preceding 1914. Serbia was seen by others as the South Slavs’ 
Piedmont, even before Belgrade eventually embraced the idea.
During the war, the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee (London-based Habsburg 
South Slavs who advocated a Yugoslav union) clashed due to their different visions of how the 
future country should be united. In short, the government preferred a centralised state built around 
the Serbian core, while the committee advocated a unification on equal terms (between two une-
qual partners, one might add). An emphasis on the disagreements in the existing literature tends to 
overshadow equally important examples of mutual understanding on such key issues as a common 
goal to create a Yugoslav state under the Serbian dynasty, and a somewhat exaggerated claim that 
all South Slavs spoke the same language and belonged to one nation. Similarly, authors looking for 
examples of ethnic conflict usually neglect important Serb wartime divisions – within the govern-
ment, and between the government, the crown and the military. Not to mention conflicting agendas 
and rivalries among Habsburg South Slavs – between the émigré Yugoslav Committee and leaders 
of the pre-war Croat-Serb Coalition who stayed in the country, as well as divisions within the 
Yugoslav Committee (e.g. Frano Supilo’s resignation in 1916).
Another overlooked unifying factor was the belief, shared by the Yugoslav Committee and 
Serbia’s leadership, in a moral superiority of their cause. They viewed themselves as representa-
tives and advocates of liberal-democratic values, which included national self-determination – just 
like their western allies, but unlike their main enemies, the Habsburg and German empires and 
Bulgaria (whose monarch, incidentally, styled himself an emperor). The war that broke out in 1914 
was the culmination of a struggle between democracy on one hand and imperialism on the other 
according to Milenko Vesnić, Serbia’s minister in Paris and a key member of the Yugoslav peace 
delegation. The Habsburg-Serbian conflict was only up to a degree down to political and economic 
factors; it was above all an ideological war, Vesnić believed, ‘a permanent, open and irreconcilable 
conflict between absolutism and democracy […] Vienna and Berlin, the Habsburgs and 
Hohenzollerns, the last representatives of absolutism and Caesarism in Europe, viewed in this, at 
the time still small, country the main haven and axis of democratic tendencies and ideas’.7 This was 
of course a contentious claim and the dichotomy – democracy vs tyranny – painted a highly 
 6. See D. Djokić, Pašić and Trumbić: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, London 2010.
 7. M. R. Vesnić, O Društvu naroda (Konferencija održana u klubu Beogradskih Radikala 30. januara 1920. god.), 
Belgrade 1920, 10-11.
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simplistic picture, albeit one which became more convincing in 1917, after the withdrawal of 
Tsarist Russia from the war and the entry into the war of the United States.
In May the same year, Habsburg South Slav deputies in the reconvened Austrian parliament 
issued a declaration calling for the creation of a mini-Yugoslavia within the monarchy. This pro-
voked a strong reaction among exiled Habsburg Yugoslavs, whose leader Ante Trumbić issued an 
appeal to the British parliament, dismissing the declaration as unrepresentative and the Reichsrat 
as an undemocratic institution.8 The declaration also accelerated talks between the Serbian govern-
ment and the Yugoslav Committee, leading to their meeting in July at Corfu, where the former fled 
after Serbia’s military defeat of late 1915. The Corfu Declaration stated that ‘this three-named 
[Serb-Croat-Slovene] people of ours is one according to blood, spoken and written language, the 
feelings of unity and continuity and compactness of territory in which it lives’. It included another 
important, yet overlooked, statement: ‘[…] the authorised representatives of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes […] demand on the basis of the principle of free national determination that the [Yugoslav 
nation] be wholly liberated […] and united in a free, national and independent state…based on 
modern and democratic principles’.9 Yugoslavia rested on the values of democracy and justice, and 
was a worthy member of an emerging world order based on the Wilsonian principles, Vesnić, who 
was also one of the authors of the Covenant of the League of Nations, claimed. He interpreted the 
Great War in terms of a struggle between freedom and tyranny, echoing the sentiments of the 
Yugoslav leadership and of the Allied statesmen at the time.10
The Ironies of Yugoslav History in the 1930s and 1940s
A Serb-Croat cooperation was necessary for a stable Yugoslavia. In the event, much of the interwar 
period was spent in an attempt to solve the Croatian question, which emerged in opposition to 
Serb-preferred centralism during the elections for a constituent assembly and constitutional debates 
of 1919-1921. Yugoslavia was built on the independent Serbian kingdom (which had united with 
the Kingdom of Montenegro one week before the proclamation of the Yugoslav union) but also on 
Croatia’s medieval state traditions, preserved in Habsburg legal documents. Considering that 
Serbia had claimed a continuity with a medieval Serbian state, and that medieval Bosnia was 
described by South Slav advocates as a proto-Yugoslav kingdom because of the title of its greatest 
ruler, king Tvrtko, it was claimed, not without contest, that the South Slav union represented the 
culmination of centuries-long struggle for independence and liberation from foreign empires. 
Yugoslavia, today often seen as a ‘prison of nations’ – not unlike the way Austria-Hungary was 
perceived in Yugoslavia – was the first state in which almost all Serbs and Croats lived together. It 
may be argued that only after 1918 the Croats and Serbs became integrated nations. It was only in 
interwar Yugoslavia that Croat (male) peasants were finally allowed to vote, which led to the trans-
formation of a previously small Peasant Party into a de facto Croatian national movement. The 
Croat Peasants’ opposition to the Serb-style centralism represented only one element of a complex 
political dynamic. At another level, Croat and Bosnian Muslim leaders had figured out a way to 
exercise a degree of autonomy in the 1920s, despite a centralist Constitution. Similarly, the govern-
ment was rarely able, or indeed willing, to fully control majority Croat areas in the second half of 
the 1930s, as, for example, the voting pattern shows.11
 8. A. Trumbitch [Trumbić], To the British Nation and Parliament: On the Convocation of the Austrian Parliament. An 
Appeal, London 1917.
 9. “Krfska deklaracija od 20. (7.) jula 1917”, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1914.-1919., 
compiled by F. Šišić, Zagreb 1920, 96-99. My emphasis.
10. Vesnić, O Društvu naroda, 13-14, 17.
11. Ferhadbegović, Prekäre Integration; Djokić, Elusive Compromise.
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A stable, long lasting national agreement may have ultimately proven elusive, but the point is 
that repeated attempts were made throughout the interwar period to reach a Serb-Croat compro-
mise. Despite political instability – by no means unique in Europe between the World Wars – 
Yugoslavia survived various crises, including political assassinations. Tragic murder of Croat 
parliamentary deputies in summer 1928 gave an authoritarian king Alexander a pretext to suspend 
the parliament, abolish the Constitution and ban political parties in early 1929. This event should 
be also understood in a wider context of the crisis of European democracy. Alexander’s statement 
about divisions caused by party rivalries echoed Marshal Piłsudski’s proclamation of dictatorship 
in Poland three years previously.
Unlike in Poland or Romania for example, there were no strong manifestations of anti-Semitism 
in interwar Yugoslavia, not even in the 1930s, despite the adoption of two anti-Jewish laws in 1940 
following Germany’s pressure on Stojadinović’s successors.12 That is not to say that the political 
life was free of violence: the Communist Party assassinated the minister of interior in 1920, and 
called for a Bolshevik-style revolution. Croat Ustaše and Macedonian revolutionaries also carried 
out terrorist attacks, including the assassination of the king in 1934; the Organisation of Yugoslav 
Nationalists, founded in Croatia, was one of several militant organisations, which included the 
Croatian Peasant Party’s para-police units and Stojadinović’s ‘green shirts’. But the country’s true 
fascists were on the margins of the political life (Ljotić’s Zbor) or based abroad and without any 
real influence until the Second World War (Pavelić’s Ustaše).
Despite becoming a dictatorship in 1929, Yugoslavia remained for a while, in terms of foreign 
policy, an integral part of the post-Versailles order, one of the reasons why Alexander, together with 
Louis Barthou, was assassinated in Marseille in October 1934. The assassin may have been a 
Macedonian revolutionary and the Attentat may have been masterminded by the Croat Ustaše, but 
it was sponsored by Mussolini’s Italy. The League of Nations chose to blame Hungary, a smaller 
revisionist nation also implicated in the assassination, in an act of appeasement which would be 
repeated several years later vis-à-vis Germany, during the Czechoslovak crisis. Almost all of 
Yugoslavia’s neighbours, which included Fascist Italy and, after the Anschluss, Nazi Germany, 
sought to revise terms of the Paris settlement. By moving closer to Berlin and Rome in the second 
half of the 1930s, during Stojadinović’s premiership and Prince Paul’s regency, the Yugoslavs 
effectively abandoned the system which had made the creation and very survival of their country 
possible.
This was not the only paradox of Yugoslavia in the 1930s. Shortly after proclaiming the dicta-
torship, king Alexander sought to create a government representative of all the main parties he had 
just abolished. Headed by an army general with no party affiliation, the new government included 
‘dissident’ members of the main Serb, Croat and Bosnian Muslim parties, while the Slovenian 
Clericals’ leader entered the new cabinet. The dictatorship may have abolished political parties, but 
the regime also created two government parties, one of which was Stojadinović’s Yugoslav Radical 
Union, a de facto coalition of Serbian Radicals, Slovenian Clericals and Bosnian Muslims. The 
dictatorship was somewhat relaxed after Alexander’s death in 1934, just as Bulgaria, Greece and 
Romania formally abandoned democracy. Quasi democratic general elections were held in 1935 
and in 1938, and local elections in 1936. Political parties, while officially banned, resumed a full 
range of activities in the second half of the 1930s, with the exception of the Communist party, 
which had been banned in the early 1920s (strictly speaking, therefore, it is wrong to claim that 
12. W. W. Hagen, “Before the ‘Final Solution’: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Political Anti-Semitism in Interwar 
Germany and Poland”, in: Journal of Modern History, 68 (June 1996) 2, 351-381; I. Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in 
Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Ithaca, NY 1995; J. Rothschild, 
East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, Seattle, WA 1974.
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Tito and the Communists banned political parties after the Second World War – most had been 
formally abolished in 1929 by king Alexander).
At the same time, Yugoslavia’s prime minister appeared to be adopting image of a fascist dicta-
tor during the second half of the 1930s. During the 1938 election campaign – when the governing 
party used the poster mentioned at the beginning of the article – prince Paul, regent of Yugoslavia, 
requested that the Belgrade police chief investigated increasingly open manifestations of fascist 
iconography by Stojadinović and his followers.13 Stojadinović’s appointment in summer 1935 was 
followed by a general political relaxation, and was greeted by the Anglophile prince-regent’s 
British allies. Yet, only a few years later, the prime minister’s supporters had begun addressing him 
as Leader (Vodja in Serbo-Croat), started wearing green-shirted uniforms, and used the fascist 
salute. Such images sent a message which some observers noted with deep concern, while others 
welcomed it – depending on their own ideological position. Reporting on political developments 
in Yugoslavia at the time, the British minister in Belgrade informed London with some concern that 
it ‘seemed as if [Stojadinović] was going to be satisfied with nothing short of personal dictator-
ship’. Count Ciano, Italy’s foreign minister, on the other hand noted with delight that the Yugoslav 
prime minister was beginning ‘to enjoy the idea of dictatorship’ and adopted the Roman salute and 
a fascist dress sense – ‘[he] wears his coat inside out showing the suede lining because it is “more 
military”’. Stojadinović, Ciano wrote in his diary, was a fascist, if not ‘by virtue of an open declara-
tion of party loyalty’, then ‘certainly […] by virtue of his conception of authority, of the state and 
of life’.14 Germany also followed with interest the Yugoslav domestic and foreign policies, noting, 
for example, the support Stojadinović enjoyed within the sizeable (around half a million strong) 
German minority in Yugoslavia and especially his friendly turn towards Rome and Berlin. While 
German diplomatic reports from Belgrade did not specifically comment on the prime minister’s 
quasi fascist image, the warm reception he was afforded by Hitler and other leading Nazi officials 
during a visit to Germany – first ever by a Yugoslav prime minister – in January 1938 was telling.15 
Following Stojadinović’s removal in February 1939, a former Yugoslav minister to Berlin was 
appointed the country’s foreign minister, and his first trip abroad was to Berlin. He would return 
there in June, as part of a Yugoslav high delegation accompanying Prince Paul and princess Olga. 
Hitler and the German leadership did their best to impress, if not intimidate, the Yugoslavs, but 
failed to persuade the prince-regent to leave the League of Nations or sign an anti-Comintern 
pact.16
After the war, Stojadinović defended his government’s turn towards Fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany in foreign policy and trade, as necessary and pragmatic. He pointed out that Britain and 
France, instead of protecting their small allies in east-central Europe, opted to appease Mussolini 
(for example regarding king Alexander’s assassination and Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia) and 
Hitler (concerning Austria and Czechoslovakia).17 Yet, Stojadinović’s unquestionable authoritarian 
tendencies, together with a (not unrelated) failure to reach a compromise with the Croats, led to his 
13. Bachmeteff Archive, Columbia University, New York, Prince Paul Papers, box 13, Milan Aćimović to Prince Paul, 
Belgrade, 24 November 1938.
14. TNA, FO 371/23875, Campbell to Halifax, Belgrade, 13 February 1939; G. Ciano, Ciano’s Diary, 1937-1943, London 
2002, 33-34; J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941, New York 1962, 82.
15. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (Berlin), Deutsche diplomatisch-politische Korrespondenz, Nr. 8, 14 
January 1938, and a memo on the visit sent to German embassies in London, Paris, Rome and several other European 
capitals, Berlin, 22 January 1938.
16. PA AA R103323 „Aufzeichnung über die innen- und außenpolitische Lege Jugoslawiens“, Berlin, 24 April 1939; PA 
AA R103324 Deutsche diplomatisch-politische Korrespondenz, Nr. 101, Berlin 30 May 1939; Hoptner, Yugoslavia in 
Crisis, 147; TNA FO 371/23876 Campbell to Halifax, Bled, 8 July 1939.
17. BAR PPP, box 13, Aćimović to Prince Paul, Belgrade, 24 November 1938; M. M. Stojadinović, Ni rat, ni pakt: 
Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, Buenos Aires 1963, 590.
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forced resignation in February 1939, only two months after less than a convincing election victory. 
A would-be Yugoslav Mussolini was thus outmanoeuvred by a reluctant regent. Oxford-educated 
Prince Paul, who was allegedly more interested in discussing and collecting modern art than in 
dealing with Yugoslavia’s politicians, proved capable of dispensing of populist and relatively pop-
ular leaders such as Stojadinović and his predecessor Bogoljub Jevtić, whom Paul similarly 
removed after an election victory in 1935. Interestingly, a British journalist observed Jevtić being 
greeted with cries of ‘Leader!’ by his party colleagues, ‘so infectious in these days are the methods 
of National Socialism and Fascism’.18
Prince Paul appeared to count days until his nephew king Peter II turned 18, so that he would be 
relieved of his duties as a regent, and contemplated stepping down at least once.19 He proved 
unwilling to abolish the royal dictatorship, but succeeded in inciting the Croats into government. 
An agreement was only possible because Maček put Croat autonomy above the united Croat-Serb 
opposition’s demands for democracy.20
In the event, Paul didn’t have to wait that long for his regency to end. Peter II was proclaimed 
of age six months prematurely, after a group of Serb officers of the Yugoslav air force deposed the 
regency and the government on 27 March 1941. This was in reaction to the government signing an 
adherence to the Tripartite Pact in Vienna two days earlier. Mass demonstrations broke out through-
out the country (but especially among Serbs, who found an alliance with Germany tantamount to 
treason) as the news spread, providing popular support for the Putschist officers (who, unsurpris-
ingly, also enjoyed Britain’s support). Paul would spend the war in Kenya and South Africa under 
British ‘protection’ (effectively house arrest), sharing, ironically, Stojadinović’s destiny. The for-
mer prime minister had been interned in Mauritius since March 1941, only weeks before Paul’s 
own downfall. Fearing that Stojadinović might be installed in power by Berlin and Rome, Paul 
asked the British for assistance in removing him from the country. Aćimović, the Belgrade police 
chief who in 1938 investigated Stojadinović on Paul’s orders, and who had briefly served as inte-
rior minister, was a prominent collaborator in German-occupied Serbia. Such were the ironies of 
Yugoslav history in the 1930s and 1940s.
Stojadinović and Vučić
Eighty years after he allegedly hoped to become Yugoslavia’s Mussolini, before prince Paul practi-
cally ended his political career in early 1939, Stojadinović seems to be making a come-back of 
sorts, thanks above all to populist Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić, as mentioned at the begin-
ning of the article. Vučić prides himself as an economic reformer, and it is in that context that his 
references to Stojadinović should be probably understood. He has not commented on Stojadinović’s 
fascist leanings, although he must be aware of them.
There are obvious analogies between Stojadinović and Vučić, two ambitious, energetic men 
attracted by the idea of strong, if not absolute, rule. Both may be described as populists and both 
performed major U-turns, albeit going in opposite directions – Stojadinović away from democracy, 
Vučić allegedly towards it. Both took charge of domestic and foreign affairs, Stojadinović for-
mally, as simultaneously prime minister and foreign minister, Vučić unofficially, as someone 
18. “The Yugoslav Regency: Is Reconciliation in Sight?”, The Times, 10 July 1935.
19. BAR PPP, box 14, Prince Paul’s resignation speech, handwritten, no date (Paul later wrote ”late 1940, early 1941” in 
the top margin of the note).
20. BAR PPP, box 2, Anton Korošec to Milan Antić, Belgrade, 16 January 1937 (on Paul’s unwillingness to abolish the 
dictatorship:); TNA FO 371/23875, R.W. Seton-Watson to Orme Sargent, 1 April 1939 and ibid., Rapp’s confidential 
despatch to Campbell, Zagreb, 7 April 1939 (on Maček giving priority to the Croat question over democracy). Lj. 
Boban, Sporazum Cvetković-Maček, Belgrade 1965, offers the most comprehensive account of the 1939 agreement.
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widely perceived to be in de facto control of the government. The 2018 Belgrade elections offer a 
good illustration of Vučić’s dominance of the Serbian politics: the pro-government list was named 
after him and he took an active part in the election campaign even though he did not run for the 
office of the mayor. Most people did not seem to find this unusual – possibly because it is assumed 
that the authoritarian and populist president would run Belgrade, just like he runs the whole coun-
try. (Despite, or because of, a convincing victory for the Vučić list – just under 45 per cent of the 
vote, well ahead of an opposition coalition which received slightly under 19 per cent – the new 
mayor of Belgrade, a former director of a city hospital with no party affiliation or previously 
known experience in politics, has been appointed three months after the elections).21
Both Stojadinović and Vučić had begun political careers in a Radical party, although Nikola 
Pašić’s People’s Radical Party – a populist and radical turned conservative party of the government 
in early twentieth century Serbia and Yugoslavia – and Vojislav Šešelj’s ultra nationalist, para-
military Serbian Radical Party are separated by more than just a century.
Indeed, the historian must remain sensitive to false analogies: Stojadinović was prime minister 
of a large South Slav state, appointed by a royal regency; his attempt to fill a dictator’s vacancy 
after king Alexander’s assassination ultimately proved unsuccessful and he was removed surpris-
ingly easily by a prince-regent whose authority many had apparently underestimated. Vučić, on the 
other hand, however authoritarian his style of government may be, is a democratically elected 
president, having previously also served as prime minister with a democratic mandate. Present-day 
Serbia, until recently an international pariah (in no small part thanks to policies previously sup-
ported and shaped by Vučić and his former allies), is much smaller and far less significant interna-
tionally than interwar Yugoslavia, which was a key member of the post-World War I order. Although 
both Stojadinović and Vučić sought to establish good relations with Berlin, fundamental differ-
ences between the Germany of the 1930s and present-day Germany require no elaboration.
Yugoslavia in the 1930s was a dictatorship which tolerated, or perhaps was unable to fully cur-
tail, democratic institutions and practices. Present-day Serbia is a democracy with serious limita-
tions, including an authoritarian leadership, censorship of media and freedom of speech, and weak 
and divided opposition. In its final years, the Yugoslav kingdom had become a dictatorship without 
a real dictator, but with a relatively democratic opposition. Contemporary Serbia, on the other 
hand, may be viewed as a democracy without a genuinely democratic government, but with an 
authoritarian leader.
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